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Abstract : Actors with joint beliefs in a decision-making process form coalitions
in order to translate their goals into policy. Yet, coalitions are not formed in an
institutional void, but rather institutions confer opportunities and constraints to
actors. This paper studies the institutional conditions under which either coalition
structures with a dominant coalition or with competing coalitions emerge. It takes
into account three conditions, i.e. the degree of federalism of a project, its degree
of Europeanisation and the openness of the pre-parliamentary phase of the
decision-making process. The cross-sectoral comparison includes the 11 most
important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006 with
a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that Europeanisation
or an open pre-parliamentary phase lead to a dominant coalition, whereas only a
specific combination of all three conditions is able to explain a structure with
competing coalitions.
Key words: coalitions, institutions, policy process, QCA, SNA, Switzerland
INTRODUCTION
In modern political systems, no collective actor is able to decisively influ-
ence decision-making on its own. Owing to the increasing complexity
of political problems and the need for organisational resources, actors
with similar preferences form coalitions. Coalition formation among poli-
tical parties is a well-known feature of legislative politics (e.g. Laver and
Schofield 1990; Mueller and Strom 2000). However, looking beyond the
parliamentary arena, several theories of the policy process, such as the
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF, Sabatier 1987), the Punctuated
Equilibrium Theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) or the Policy Network
Approach (e.g. Adam and Kriesi 2007), focus on coalitions involving
political parties, interest groups, administrative agencies or subnational
actors. Scholarly interest for coalitions in policy processes rests upon the
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premise that the coalition structure has consequences on the outcome of a
policy process (e.g. Knoke et al. 1996; Adam and Kriesi 2007).
Yet, coalitions do not form in an institutional void. Just as institutional
rules influence the formation of coalition governments (e.g. Mueller and
Strom 2000), the emergence of coalitions in the policy process depends on
the institutional contexts that confer opportunities and constraints to actors
(Kübler 2001). An example for institutional constraints are veto points
(Immergut 1990) that require the formation of broad coalitions (Sabatier
and Weible 2007, 200). Institutional opportunities are, for example, given
by working groups that are accessible to non-state actors and enable actors’
coordination (Leifeld and Schneider 2012).
The role of the institutional context for coalition formation is, however,
largely neglected in the literature. While the ACF (Sabatier 1987) suggests
that the similar preferences of actors are the main element explaining coali-
tion formation, the interplay between beliefs, institutions and coalition
formation is not well established (Weible and Sabatier 2005; Sabatier and
Weible 2007; Weible et al. 2011). Institutional explanations have only
recently been integrated into research on the Policy Network Approach
(e.g. Adam and Kriesi 2007; Leifeld and Schneider 2012). Studying the
effects of institutions on coalition formation is important for at least two
reasons. First, neglecting the institutional conditions under which coalitions
form leads researchers to overemphasise the importance of preferences.
Second, if institutions affect the coalition structure, then they are also
important for understanding the prospects of policy change (Sabatier 1998;
Sabatier and Weible 2007).
The aim of this paper is to study the influence of federalism, Europeani-
sation and venue openness on the coalition structure. Federalism and
Europeanisation act as institutional constraints by defining the set of actors
that need to be included in a dominant coalition. Open venues of the policy
process, on the contrary, provide actors with opportunities for forming
dominant coalitions. Federalism, Europeanisation and open venues are all
expected to contribute to the emergence of dominant coalitions, while their
absence is expected to lead to several competing coalitions.
I compare the 11most important policy processes in Switzerland between
2001 and 2006. In the consensus democracy of Switzerland, the four
biggest parties are included in government, but the Social Democrats and
the Swiss People’s Party, especially, oppose governmental projects on a
regular basis (e.g. Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). Partly as a consequence
thereof, the compositions of coalitions vary across projects, which makes
Switzerland a good example to illustrate the effect of institutions on coali-
tion formation. The 11 cases are compared by a Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA, Ragin 1987). Data were gathered through interviews with
246 F I SCHER
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
01
43
81
4X
14
00
01
66
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
1:
06
:5
6,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
Ca
m
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
representatives of 251 collective political actors, as well as from extensive
documentary sources on the 11 processes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section
discusses theoretical elements on coalition formation. I then formulate
expectations about the influence of institutional conditions on coalition
structures. The third section presents data and methods, while the compara-
tive analysis follows in the fourth section. The final section concludes.
Coalition structures and institutional context
Coalition structures
In modern political systems, no collective actor is able to decisively influence
decision-making on its own. Whereas coalition formation is a well-known
strategy used by political parties in parliament to pass legislation or form a
government (e.g. Laver and Schofield 1990;Mueller and Strom 2000), there is
broad evidence that actors also form coalitions in order to influence policy
making beyond parliament (Sabatier 1987; Baumgartner and Jones 1993;
Knoke et al. 1996; Adam and Kriesi 2007). Besides political parties, different
types of actors, such as interest groups, state actors or subnational units, are
part of coalitions. Coalitions are groups of actors with similar beliefs that
engage in some degree of coordination in order to influence a policy project
(Sabatier and Weible 2007). Forming coalitions allows them to coordinate
their actions, join organisational and financial resources or demonstrate
broad support for a project (Mahoney 2007).Most often such coalitions form
only around a given policy project (Knoke 2011) and are informal (Heaney
2006). Besides benefits, being part of a coalition also implies costs for actors,
as they have to invest in internal coordination and communication efforts and
might have to give up parts of their own position (Schlager 1995; Knoke et al.
1996;Mahoney 2007; Henry 2011). There are usually two or three coalitions
present in a given policy process (Sabatier 1987; Knoke et al. 1996; Sabatier
and Weible 2007).
Besides their number, one needs to assess the power of coalitions. Indeed,
the interest of assessing coalition structures is largely based on its crucial
impact upon the outcomes of the process and the potential for policy
change (e.g. Knoke et al. 1996; Adam and Kriesi 2007). If a broad majority
of powerful actors form a single, dominant coalition, this coalition should
be able to make its preferred policy outcome pass into legislation.1Minority
coalitions containing a small number of weak actors, if they exist, are
1 Such a situation with a dominant coalition can indicate the existence of a policy monopoly
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991).
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unable to decisively influence the outcome. However, note that a structure
with a dominant coalition does not automatically lead to policy change, as
this also depends on the preferences of the coalition. On the contrary, there
may exist situations with several equally powerful coalitions (e.g. Weible
2005). In a situation of competing coalitions, policy change is unlikely, as
coalitions can block each other or may have to negotiate lowest common
denominator compromises.
To be sure, power is not the only characteristic that defines a coalition.
Other important elements are the number of actors in a coalition, its
cohesiveness and its internal agreement (i.e. Lubell et al. 2012, 353).
However, as noted above, a large number of coalition members or strong
internal coordination also imply costs. This complicates the link between
these characteristics of coalitions and their ability to influence decision-
making. I thus argue that power is an encompassing characteristic expres-
sing a coalitions’ ability to influence process outcomes, given the benefits
and costs emerging from other coalition characteristics.
Institutional conditions and coalition formation
Coalition formation, maintenance and the strategies and resources avail-
able to them depend on the institutional context. Institutions refer to
the formal and informal norms that both constrain and enable the behav-
iour of political actors (Ostrom 1990, 2005). Based on the literature on
Political Opportunity Structures (e.g. Kriesi 1995), Kübler (2001) argues
that coalitions adapt their strategies to the institutional context. Further,
the “professional fora” facilitating cross-coalition learning (Sabatier 1987)
are institutions offering opportunities for coalitions’ learning processes.
However, before being able to define strategies or learn, coalitions need to
form. Coalition formation is also influenced by the institutional context, as
institutions affect the collective action problem that actors face by influen-
cing the costs and benefits of coalition formation (Schlager 1995).
While some institutions are constant within a country, others vary
between policy subsystems. The influence of country-specific institutions on
coalitions has been addressed elsewhere (e.g. Kübler 2001; Sabatier and
Weible 2007; Nohrstedt 2011; Weible et al. 2011). In this paper, country-
specific institutions are constant, and I focus instead on subsystem-specific
variation within one country. I consider three important institutions in Swiss
politics (e.g. Kriesi and Trechsel 2008), i.e. federalism, Europeanisation and
the venues of the preparatory phase of the policy process.2 While the first two
2 Another institutional condition potentially influencing coalition structures is the refer-
endum. However, this institution is very specific to the Swiss case. In addition, it depends,
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represent constraints for actors, the last condition acts as an opportunity
for actors.
First, policy processes that touch upon the federalist organisation
of competences bring strong constraints to actors for coalition-building.
Federalism leads to power dispersion across the central state and the sub-
national units (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2003). For example, in systems
of cooperative federalism, decisions taken at the higher level are often
implemented at the lower level, thereby conferring a de facto veto power to
subnational units. While subnational governments are directly involved in
decision-making at the higher level in Germany or the European Union
(EU) (Scharpf 1988, 2006), Swiss cantons are granted an indirect veto
power through the popular referendum (Fischer et al. 2010).3 The need to
find solutions supported by both levels makes federal systems less prone to
change (Scharpf 1988, 2006; Tsebelis 2002). The dispersion of power in
federalist systems thus impacts upon the need for coalitions to include
actors from both levels in order to increase their chances for success. This
does not concern all policy processes in federalist systems, but rather only
the ones that tackle the distribution of competences between the levels of
the federalist state. If this is the case, cantons are directly concerned with
decision-making at the national level and need to be included in a dominant
coalition. Supported by a dominant coalition composed of both levels of the
federalist state, a federalist project is unlikely to be hampered by other (e.g.
the classical left-right) conflicts (Thomas 2001, 16f.; Linder 2005, 117). On
the contrary, if all cantons or parts of them do not support a project,
chances are high that it will fail sooner or later. Federalism thus acts as a
constraint upon actors, i.e. it defines the set of actors that needs to be
included in the dominant coalition. Federalism is therefore expected
to contribute to the emergence of a dominant coalition. The absence of
federalism favours competing coalitions.
Second, Europeanisation describes the phenomenon by which more
and more domestic policy projects are influenced by the EU (e.g. Börzel
and Risse 2000). Europeanisation affects not only substantive policies, but
also domestic institutions and the constellation among domestic actors
(Sciarini et al. 2004). In Europeanised projects, state executives try to
achieve their foreign policy priorities in international negotiations.
They play a “two-level game” (Putnam 1988), and their presence at the
international negotiation table confers them power (Moravcsik 1993).
especially in its optional form, largely on actors’ strategies and therefore cannot be considered as
an external institutional factor affecting coalition formation.
3 The double majority clause regarding the popular vote on constitutional amendments
requires a majority of the people and a majority of cantons to accept a project.
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However, state actors also have to look for domestic support for an inter-
national treaty. While it is unclear whether Europeanisation increases
or decreases domestic conflict (Fischer 2012, 82), state actors always face
the risk that their international treaty fails in the domestic ratification
phase. To reduce this risk and reach broad support for the treaty, they have
to integrate the most important domestic non-state actors in a dominant
coalition (Fischer and Sciarini 2013). The specific institutional design of
Europeanised projects thus acts as a constraint for state actors. Europea-
nisation is expected to contribute to the emergence of a dominant coalition.
On the contrary, if a project concerns domestic politics, this enables a
structure with competing coalitions.
Third, political decision-making in modern democracies happens in
different subsequent or parallel institutional venues, such as working
groups or consultation procedures. Such institutional venues and actors’
participation therein have been shown to foster cooperation among actors
(Schneider et al. 2003; Leifeld and Schneider 2012). The venues vary in
terms of their number and accessability for non-state actors (Sabatier and
Weible 2007). The venues of the preparatory, pre-parliamentary phase are
considered the most important in Swiss policy processes. Its working
groups and consultation procedures offer access points for non-state actors
that allow them to try to influence the project accordingly (e.g. Sciarini
2006). The accessibility of the preparatory phase positively influences
actors’ opportunities to form a dominant coalition. The possibility to
participate in the open venues of the preparatory phase reduces the actors’
costs of exchanging their views, establishing cooperation and negotiating
a compromise solution.4 Open venues are thus expected to lead to the
formation of a dominant coalition. In contrast, a closed preparatory phase
contributes to a structure of competing coalitions.
Based on these arguments, I formulate the following set of hypotheses:
(H1): Federalism contributes to the emergence of a dominant coalition.
(H2): Europeanisation contributes to the emergence of a dominant
coalition.
(H3): A policy process with open venues contributes to the emergence of a
dominant coalition.
The absence of all three conditions should favour the emergence of com-
peting coalitions.
4 Note that a rival theoretical argument suggests that open institutional venues, rather than
fostering cooperation and consensus seeking, provoke conflict (Leach et al. 2002).
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Data and methods
The analysis relies on a cross-sectoral comparison of the 11 most important
policy processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006.5 Arguably, the most
important processes may not be representative of the whole population of
policy processes in Switzerland. Implications of case selection are discussed in
the conclusions. The cases are the 11th pension reform, the programme of
budget relief 2003, the extension of the bilateral agreement on the free
movement of persons and flanking measures, the bilateral agreement on the
taxation of savings, the bilateral agreement on Schengen/Dublin, the law on
nuclear energy, the law on the infrastructure funds, the new law on foreigners,
the reform of fiscal equalisation and tasks distribution, the new constitutional
articles on education and the law on telecommunication. Data on these pro-
cesses were gathered through approximately 250 semi-structured interviews
with individual representatives of collective actors involved in the respective
policy processes. Based on positional, decisional and reputational approaches
(e.g. Knoke 1993, 30), 20–30 organisational actors per process were identi-
fied and interviewed.6 Besides the answers to the pre-structured questions,
additional, qualitative pieces of information shared by the interview partners
on a voluntary basis were collected in an interview protocol, which provided
helpful information for the in-depth knowledge of cases. Further, the study of
official documents provided supplementary information on the processes.
Methodologically, the study relies on an innovative combination (see Fischer
2011). First, Social Network Analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994) tools are
applied to reconstruct coalition structures in the 11 cases. Relying on such
formal tools ensures that the same criteria are used for the reconstruction of the
coalition structures across different types of actors and policy processes. Sec-
ond, the 11 cases are compared with a QCA (e.g. Ragin 1987; Rihoux and
Ragin 2009). QCA is a method for the systematic comparison of usually a
medium (5–50) number of cases and relies on the systematic description of
cases. It allows for complex causality, i.e. the fact that different combinations of
causal conditions can lead to a particular outcome, and that the effect of a
condition is dependent on its combination with other conditions. This method
reduces the combination of conditions by eliminating redundant conditions
and identifies necessary and sufficient conditions leading to an outcome.7
5 The importance of the policy processes is based on a written expert survey among
approximately 80 experts of Swiss politics conducted in 2007.
6 Interviews were conducted between February and July 2008 by the author of this paper and
four specifically trained colleagues.
7 Sufficient conditions always lead to an outcome, but the outcome can also be caused by
other, alternative conditions. Necessary conditions need to be present for an outcome to occur,
but they do not automatically lead to the outcome (Ragin 1987).
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Nevertheless, I explicitly refrain from formulating strong hypotheses on
necessity and sufficiency, as such causes are supposed to be rare in political
decision-making. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), as
used in this study, allows overcoming the inherent limitation of the dichot-
omisation of the conditions and the outcome. Fuzzy-set membership scores
take on values between 0 and 1 (Ragin 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009).
Calibration of outcome and conditions
Actors in a coalition do not only have similar beliefs, but also need to coor-
dinate their activities (Schlager 1995;Weible and Sabatier 2005; Henry 2011).
Therefore, coalitions are identified with a two-step procedure. In the first step,
actors are regrouped into blocks according to their profiles of convergence and
divergence of beliefs. Based on a list comprising all actors participating in
the process, interview partners were asked to select the actors with which
their organisation had mainly convergent or divergent beliefs concerning the
project. This results in a directed matrix with positive values indicating con-
vergence and negative values indicating divergence of beliefs. These subjective
perceptions of actors’ agreement with other actors are a good proxy for their
joint beliefs (Ingold 2011). Blocks are then identified with the “balance” pro-
cedure in Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar 1996). This procedure continuously
rearranges thematrix of actors until it reaches an arrangement that is closest to
a pre-defined structure with only positive within-block ties and negative
between-block ties (Nooy et al. 2005). Deviations from this ideal arrangement
are indicated with an error term that varies according to the number of blocks
(Doreian andMrvar 2009). I selected the block structure with the lowest error
term. Depending on the case, this procedure results in two to five blocks.
Actors within one block have convergent beliefs, while actors from different
blocks have divergent beliefs. However, as having the same beliefs is not
enough for actors to form a coalition, the second step identifies actors within
each block that cooperate at least indirectly. Based on a list comprising all
actors participating in the process, interview partners were asked to select the
actors with which their organisation was cooperating closely, i.e. had frequent
contacts during the policy process. As cooperation always needs two actors,
only reciprocated cooperation ties were used for the analysis. Based on the
cooperation network among the actors within each block, I identified two
cliques (Wasserman and Faust 1994) in UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002). This
allowed me to eliminate actors that have similar beliefs but are not well inte-
grated in the cooperation structure within the block.8 An alternative criterion,
8 Within each block identified before, the two clique with the highest internal cooperation
density was selected.
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i.e. direct cooperation, is too strict, because a coalition might be composed of
some important, leading actors and some less important actors. These do not
need to cooperate directly as long as they all cooperate with the leading actors
(Hojnacki 1998). Thus, actors sharing similar beliefs (step 1) and cooperating
at least indirectly (step 2) form a coalition. Similar beliefs are analysed before
cooperation, because it is the more important criterion for the identification of
a coalition. I rely on a broad and neutral definition of cooperation, so that the
fact that political actors cooperate closely does not necessarily mean that they
agree on the substantive policy issue at stake. While internal cooperation
is important for a coalition, cooperation also occurs across coalitions. The
information on cooperation is therefore less adapted for the first step of the
identification of coalitions.
The power of coalitions is calculated in a third step. This is done by
aggregating the reputational power of each actor in the coalition. Actors’
reputational power is based on information from the interviews. From the
same list comprising all actors participating in the process, interview partners
were asked to indicate those actors that, in their view, were very influential in
the policy process. Based on these answers, a score of reputational power was
calculated for each actor, corresponding to the average of the judgements for
a given actor by all interview partners. The aggregation on the coalition level
is then computed as the average between the “part-of-the-sum” and the
average score of the reputation of each coalition.9 Table A.1 in the Appendix
gives an overview of the calibration of the outcome. The transformation from
the indicator for power of the most powerful coalition to fuzzy-values is
based on the direct method of calibration for interval variables (Ragin 2008).
The crossover point is defined at 50, i.e. if (in the presence of at least three
coalitions) one coalition has 50% of power.
Tables A.2–A.4 in the Appendix present the calibration of the conditions.
For the assessment of the degrees of Europeanisation and federalism, sub-
stantive case knowledge stemming from qualitative information from
the interviews and documentary sources is used. Fully federalist cases are
given by projects that aim at reforming the distribution of competences
between the Confederation and cantons. The education reform, for example,
revised the distribution of competences between the Confederation and the
cantons in the domain of education and is therefore a fully federalist case
9 The “part-of-the-sum” measure (summing up the reputational power of actors in the coa-
lition and expressing the sum as the part of the total power of all coalitions) tends to overestimate
the power of coalitions that contain a lot of actors with little power. The average measure
(calculating the average reputational power of all actors in a coalition) tends to underestimate the
power of these coalitions. Using the mean of the two measures enables me to control for these
potential biases.
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(fuzzy-value 1). A case is considered fully Europeanised if it only includes a
bilateral treaty with the EU. The agreement on Schengen/Dublin is a mostly
Europeanised case, as the bilateral treaty was accompanied only by some
minor domestic adaptations (0.8). The pension scheme reform, on the con-
trary, did not concern cantons at all, and the EU did not influence this process
either. This case is therefore fully non-federalist and fully domestic (0). The
openness of venues is assessed by two indicators: the percentage of venues in
the preparatory phase constituting formal access points for non-state actors10
and the percentage of non-state actors participating in all venues in the pre-
paratory phase. The second indicator is calculated as the average of each
venue’s openness. This again is expressed as the percentage of all non-state
actors involved in the process that participated in the given venue. To assess
their participation at the different venues in the preparatory phase of
the policy process, interview partners were asked in which venues their
organisation was involved from a list of all venues in the preparatory phase.
The final indicator on the openness of the process is calculated as the average
of both indicators. For the transformation into fuzzy-values, I rely on the
direct method of calibration for interval variables (Ragin 2008). The cross-
over point is defined at 0.5, which indicates that venues are neither open nor
closed to non-state actors.
Table 1 shows the fuzzy-values for the outcome and the conditions.
DOM represents the outcome of the analysis, i.e. the set of cases with a
Table 1. Calibration of outcome and conditions
Case
Dominant coalition
(DOM)
Federalism
(FED)
Europeanisation
(EUR)
Open venues
(OPEN)
Nuclear 0.26 0.2 0.2 0.33
Pension 0.08 0 0 0.28
Fiscal equalisation 0.70 1 0 0.77
Budget 0.82 0.2 0 0.62
Persons 0.83 0.2 0.6 0.35
Savings 0.85 0 0.8 0.17
Schengen 0.73 0.4 0.8 0.13
Foreigners 0.81 0.4 0.4 0.65
Education 0.91 1 0 0.81
Telecom 0.37 0 0.4 0.08
Infrastructure 0.62 0.6 0 0.56
10 The reconstruction of the venues of the policy process is based on documentary sources and
was validated by the interview partners.
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dominant coalition. The conditions are abbreviated by FED (federalist
cases), EUR (Europeanised cases) and OPEN (cases with open venues).
Analysis
Sufficient conditions for the emergence of a dominant coalition11
The combination of three conditions results in eight possible configura-
tions. Table 2 shows the four combinations that are empirically observed.
The remaining combinations are logical remainders and do not appear in
the table.12 The cases listed in the last column of each row are its strong
members, i.e. cases lying more inside than outside of the given set. The
consistency scores indicate to what extent the empirical observations sup-
port the postulate that the combination of conditions in a row is sufficient
for the emergence of the outcome. Rows of the truth table whose strong
members are members of the outcome set (and simultaneously have a
consistency value of at least 0.75) are coded with the value 1; the others are
coded 0 (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Compared with stricter criteria,
this focus on strong members results in solutions with higher coverage but
lower consistency values. In order to explain a maximum of cases, the
highest possible coverage values should be reached.13 For the reduction of
the solution term, I focus on the complex solution that makes no simplifying
Table 2. Truth table for the analysis of dominant coalitions
FED EUR OPEN Consistency DOM Strong members
0 1 0 0.99 1 Persons, Schengen, Savings
1 0 1 0.98 1 Fiscal equalisation, Education, Infrastructure
0 0 1 0.91 1 Budget, Foreigners
0 0 0 0.67 0 Telecom, Pension, Nuclear
Note: FED = federalism; EUR = Europeanisation; OPEN = open venues; DOM =
dominant coalition.
11 Table A.5 in the Appendix presents the results for the analysis of necessary conditions.
Results correspond to the analysis of sufficiency and theoretical expectations. Non-federalism, a
domestic process and closed venues are all necessary conditions for the emergence of competing
coalitions (based on a consistency value of at least 0.90; see Schneider andWagemann 2010). No
condition is necessary for the formation of a dominant coalition.
12 Logical remainders are combinations of conditions that are not observed. For most of
these, it is likely that they do exist in reality. Some combinations, like Europeanised cases with
open venues, however, are most likely not observable in reality.
13 Empirical applications indicate that coverage levels ranging from 0.60 to 0.70 are already
relatively high (Schneider and Grofman 2006).
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assumptions, i.e. no assumptions on the outcome of logical remainders
(Ragin 2008). All analyses are conducted with the computer program
fsQCA (Ragin et al. 2009).
Table 3 shows the solution term. The consistency and coverage scores
express to what extent statements about set-theoretic relations between
conditions and an outcome enjoy empirical support.14 Two types of policy
processes, i.e. domestic processes with open venues and Europeanised, non-
federalist processes with closed venues, lead to dominant coalitions.
The first sufficient combination of conditions, i.e. a domestic process
with open venues, lends support to Hypothesis 3, which states that open
venues contribute to the emergence of a dominant coalition. However,
the comparative analysis indicates that the effect of process openness on the
coalition structure holds only for domestic processes.15 Open venues in the
preparatory phase of the policy process give actors the opportunity to meet,
Table 3. Sufficient conditions for the emergence of a dominant coalition
Consistency
Raw
coverage
Unique
coverage Cases covered
eur*OPEN+ 0.93 0.62 0.44 Fiscal equalisation,
Education, Budget,
Infrastructure, Foreigners
fed*EUR*open 0.99 0.42 0.23 Persons, Schengen, Savings
Solution eur*OPEN+ fed*EUR*open
Total consistency 0.94
Total coverage 0.86
Notes: Intermediate solution (assumptions FED, EUR, OPEN): EUR+OPEN.
Easy solution: EUR+OPEN.
OPEN = open venues; EUR = Europeanisation; FED = federalism.
14 The consistency score provides information on the extent to which the empirical obser-
vation supports the postulate of a perfect relationship between the conditions and the outcome, or
how well the solution formula describes the cases. The coverage measure is an indicator of the
empirical importance of a relationship. It indicates what proportion of the fuzzy-membership
values of the cases in the set of the outcome can be explained by the solution (Ragin 2008). In the
tables, the asterisk stands for the logical “and” and the plus sign stands for the logical “or”.
Conditions and outcomes written with capital letters stand for their presence; those in lower case
letters indicate the absence of the phenomenon.
15 Given that both venue openness and a domestic process are required in order for a com-
bination of conditions to be sufficient for the outcome to occur, the analysis does not allow for
conclusions about the effect of venue openness in Europeanised processes. However, theory
suggests that the existence of Europeanised processes with open venues is very unlikely anyhow,
as the pace of international negotiations complicates the broad inclusion of non-state actors
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exchange information and learn about their beliefs, and thereby reduces
costs for coalition formation. A closer look at each case illustrates how
actors took advantage of these opportunities. In the project on the law on
foreigners, the dominant coalition, including the federal administration,
public and business interest groups and centre-right and right-wing political
parties, formed during the very open preparatory phase. Already the first
report on the project in 1995 was subject to a consultation procedure,
allowing actors to react and express their preferences. In addition, the
governing parties met in a working group, and the representatives of the
federal and cantonal agencies, as well as interest groups dealing with
the problem, had the opportunity to form a dominant coalition in no fewer
than three working groups and expert committees preparing the project. In
the case of the fiscal equalisation scheme, open venues allowed for strong
cooperation between the Confederation and the cantons in the project
organisation and in several project groups. These bipartite bodies allowed a
careful elaboration of a mutually acceptable solution (see also Braun 2009).
The dominant coalition of centre-right parties, business associations and
the federal government in the case of the programme of budget relief was
also clearly favoured by open venues. On the one hand, centre-right parties
pressured the government by means of parliamentary motions,16 and the
parliamentary delegation on finance and the finance committees of both
chambers were involved in the process very early. On the other hand,
cantons were consulted in order to avoid increasing costs for them as a
consequence of budget cuts at the level of the Confederation, and were thus
included in the dominant coalition. In the case of the education reform, after
Table 4. Truth table for the analysis of competing coalitions
FED EUR OPEN Consistency DOM Strong members
0 0 0 0.83 1 Telecom, Pension, Nuclear
0 0 1 0.64 0 Budget, Foreigners
1 0 1 0.50 0 Fiscal equalisation, Education, Infrastructure
0 1 0 0.47 0 Savings, Persons, Schengen
Note: FED = federalism; EUR = Europeanisation; OPEN = open venues; DOM =
dominant coalition.
(e.g. Moravcsik 1994; Sciarini et al. 2002, 2004). Further, empirical evidence from my cases
shows that venue openness is among the lowest in the Europeanised cases (see Table 1).
16 Interviews: Christian-Democratic Party, St.Gallen, 21 April 2008; Federal Finance
Administration, Berne, 20March 2008 and Swiss People’s Party, Mettmenstetten, 23 June 2008.
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an initial blockage by the cantons, they were included as equal partners in the
preparation of the bill (see Fischer et al. 2010). In addition, because the par-
liamentary commissions played an unusually strong role and, together with
the Conference of Cantonal Directors of Education, worked out a compro-
mise in many joint meetings, political parties were strongly involved in
extremely open venues. Finally, in the case of the infrastructure fund, the
initiative of the administration to bring together all key actors of the domain
of traffic and transport immediately after the rejection of the predecessor
project was the basis for the emergence of a consensus within a dominant
coalition.17 In addition, the political parties consulted via the parliamentary
committees and cantons as important players in the domain of traffic and
transport policy were included in the process via the Conference of Cantonal
Directors of Public Transport and the Conference of Cantonal Directors of
Building, Planning and Environment.
An alternative sufficient condition for the emergence of a dominant coa-
lition is given by the combination of Europeanised, non-federalist processes
with closed venues. This lends support to Hypothesis 2, which postulates
that Europeanisation contributes to the emergence of a dominant coalition.
However, according to empirical evidence from the comparative analysis,
this is only the case in non-federalist processes with closed venues.18 In
Europeanised processes, the executive has to defend the treaty it negotiated
internationally on the domestic level. It therefore has to gather domestic
support before or during the international negotiation phase. In the three
cases of the bilateral treaties on the free movement of persons, the taxation of
savings and Schengen/Dublin, a dominant coalition with actors from the
centre and the left was opposed to a minority coalition of the national-
conservative and extreme right. In the case of the free movement of persons,
the strong efforts of the federal government to create a dominant coalition at
the domestic level are obvious. Already during the negotiation phase, a
tripartite working group with representatives of the administration, trade
unions and business associations was formed in order to address the strong
demand from the left for an extension of the flanking measures for the
protection of the domestic workforce. Without the support of the left and
the almost certain rejection of the treaty by the national-conservative right,
17 Interviews: Cantonal Directors of Public Transport, Solothurn, 28 May 2008; Conference
of Cantonal Directors of Building, Planning and Environment, Zurich, 28 April 2008 and Social-
Democratic Party, Schaffhausen, 23 June 2008.
18 Results do not allow conclusions to be made about Europeanised processes that are also
federalist and/or have open venues. However, as explained in FN15, Europeanised processes with
open venues are rather unlikely. Given the Confederations’ exclusive competence for the inter-
national relations of the country, the existence of processes that are both Europeanised and
federalist is also very unlikely.
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the extension of the treaty would have been doomed to failure.19 Thanks to
their concessions concerning the extension of the flanking measures,
the government could win the support of the left and integrate it into the
dominant coalition. Concerning the treaty on Schengen/Dublin, there was no
comparable threat from the left. Still, the government informally negotiated
with the cantons affected by the shifts of competences concerning the border
guard and police forces.20 In addition, many other interests affected by the
treaty (tourism, banking, gun possession, data protection) were involved via
their federal agencies in the inclusive negotiation delegation.21 Finally, in the
case of the agreement on the taxation of savings, Swiss banks as the main
stakeholders were heavily involved in the elaboration of the Swiss proposal
for negotiations. Given that the proposal elaborated in cooperation with the
banks proved successful in the international negotiations, the federal govern-
ment had provided the necessary domestic support for the agreement.22
Evidence from the cases lends strong support for the claim that both
Europeanisation and open venues contribute to the emergence of a domi-
nant coalition of actors. While the first brings constraints and urges state
executives to form dominant coalitions, the second reduces the costs for
actors’ coordination and presents them with opportunities to form a
dominant coalition. According to the results, the third condition included in
the analysis, i.e. federalism, is not related to the emergence of a dominant
coalition. I therefore must reject Hypothesis 1. Indeed, it could well occur
that the Confederation and the cantons are unable to build a dominant
coalition, or that not all cantons can be included.23
Sufficient conditions for a structure of competing coalitions
Table 4 presents the truth table for the analysis of competing coalitions.
Table 5 shows the combination of conditions that are sufficient for the
emergence of competing coalitions. Only a specific combination of conditions,
i.e. non-federalist and domestic processes with closed venues, leads to a
structure of competing coalitions. This finding lends further support to
Hypotheses 2 and 3 (and some support to Hypothesis 1). If all three
19 Interview: State’s Secretary for Economic Affairs, Basel, 6 March 2008.
20 Interview: Radical-Democratic Party, Zurich, 21 April 2008.
21 Interviews: Federal Police Administration, Berne, 30 June 2008; Swiss Association for
Shooting Sports, Lucerne, 10 April 2008.
22 Interviews: Integration Office, Berne, 23 April 2008; Swiss Bankers’ Association, Basel,
22 April 2008.
23 However, all federalist projects in this analysis do also have open venues and all of them
result in a dominant coalition. Thus, the formation of a dominant coalition in these federalist
projects seems to happen according to the logic of open venues, which represents a more general
explanation for the emergence of a dominant coalition.
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conditions are needed for the explanation of competing coalitions, this sug-
gests that every condition for itself can potentially explain the emergence of a
dominant coalition.
In non-federalist and domestic projects, the government has no immedi-
ate institutional constraint – or incentive – to build a dominant coalition. As
different domestic societal interests should be accommodated, there is not
one partner with which to find a compromise, but at least two opposing
sides. In addition, without the opportunity of consultation and negotiation
in open venues, no dominant coalition can be formed.
Cases with competing coalitions include the pension scheme reform, the
law on nuclear energy and the law on telecommunications. The pension
scheme reform opposes the left and the right. On the one side, the left
parties and trade unions, as representatives of women and workers, would
have been the main and direct losers of the proposed revision. On the other
side, the centre-right parties and business associations represent the
employers that are partially responsible for financing the pension scheme.
State actors were aware of this important conflict and tried to open up
venues in the preparatory phase of the policy process. Social partners
and the cantons did have some access to the interdepartmental working
group. Accordingly, a certain degree of consensus, including an increase in
the value-added tax instead of the contribution from wages, was found in
the preparatory phase.24 However, it also became increasingly clear that
there were large concerns on the left side, particularly regarding the flexibi-
lity of the retirement and reduction of the widow’s pension.25 As opposed
to trade unions, women’s associations and left parties, i.e. actors particu-
larly concerned by the reduction of the widow’s pension, were not
Table 5. Sufficient conditions for the emergence of competing coalitions
Consistency Raw coverage Unique coverage
fed*eur*open 0.83 0.81 0.81
Notes: Intermediate solution (assumptions fed, eur, open): fed*eur*open.
Easy solution: eur*open.
FED = federalism; EUR = Europeanisation; OPEN = open venues.
24 Interviews: Swiss Association of Employers, Zurich, 10 March 2008; Federal Office of
Social Security, Fribourg, 28 February 2008/Christian-Democratic Party, Luzern, 29 April 2008.
25 Interviews: Federal Office of Social Security, Fribourg, 28 February 2008; Swiss People’s
Party, Berne, 11 June 2008; Green Paty, Berne, 1 April 2009; Christian-Democratic Party,
Luzern, 29 April 2008.
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intensely included in the venues of the policy process.26 The relevant
discussions were therefore postponed to parliament, where the Federal
Council’s proposal was narrowly supported by a centre-right coalition.27
Finally, the left coalition challenged the bill in an optional referendum,
where the project failed to pass.
Since the law on telecommunications is only indirectly Europeanised and
thus not directly linked to an international agreement, the federal government
was not constrained to form a dominant coalition to support an international
treaty. Indeed, different coalitions of private actors formed. First, there was a
coalition of centre parties, which, together with the alternative providers and
regulatory authorities, aimed to liberalise the last mile. Second, the former
monopolist Swisscom, obviously opposed to further liberalisation, formed a
coalition together with left parties and trade unions that were worried about
the impact of liberalisation on the “public service” and the labour market.
Third, the Swiss People’s Party played an ambivalent role during the process
but finally opposed liberalisation. Owing to the high complexity of the
domain and pressure from the regulatory authority and the Federal Court,
the preparatory phase took place mainly at the administrative and judicial
levels and remained closed to external actors. Political parties or interest
groups were hardly involved in the preparation of the bill. The federal
government could therefore not form a sufficiently dominant coalition. In the
case of the nuclear energy law, the federal government and its administration
tried to develop a compromise between the pro-nuclear centre-right coalition
and the anti-nuclear left coalition. Without immediate constraints to form a
dominant coalition, reaching a compromise in this traditionally conflictive
policy domain proved difficult. Despite some officially open venues, non-state
actors were unwilling or unable to actively participate in the preparations of
the bill.
Conclusions
This paper studies the institutional conditions under which given coalition
structures in policy processes emerge. By so doing, it tackles the interplay
between beliefs, institutions and coalition formation. This aspect has been
largely neglected in the literature on coalition formation in the policy pro-
cess (Weible and Sabatier 2005; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Weible et al.
2011; Leifeld and Schneider 2012).
26 Trade unions, which were present in the preparatory phase, are – contrary to left parties –
not typical representatives of the new, value-based social demands like the one for gender equality
(Häusermann et al. 2004, 50).
27 Interview: Federal Office of Social Security, Berne, 14 February 2008.
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Institutions refer to the formal and informal norms that both constrain
and enable the behaviour of political actors (Ostrom 1990, 2005; Lubell
et al. 2012). This analysis took into account the institutional conditions of
federalism, Europeanisation and venue openness. First, federalist projects
present a constraint for coalition formation, as they define the actors whose
agreement is absolutely needed, i.e. the cantons. In the federalist cases under
study, cantons were included through open venues. This seems to be the
more general explanation for the emergence of a dominant coalition than
federalism. Second, Europeanisation constrains state actors to form a
dominant coalition in order to secure domestic support for the international
treaty. This is best illustrated by the project on the free movement of
persons, where demands of the left were satisfied in order to include it in a
dominant coalition. Third, open venues present an opportunity for actors
to form a dominant coalition. The possibility to meet and negotiate in open
venues reduces the costs of coalition formation for actors. For example, in
the project of the infrastructure funds, the effort of the state administration
to bring together all interested actors at the beginning of the policy process
was the basis for the formation of a dominant coalition. On the contrary,
without any of the three institutional conditions present, actors have a hard
time forming a dominant coalition and tend to compete in different, equally
strong coalitions.
Understanding coalitions is important because the coalition structure
influences the possibility for policy change, at least indirectly. If a dominant
coalition wants to change the policy in a policy subsystem, minority coali-
tions are most certainly unable to block change. For example, the agree-
ment on Schengen/Dublin or the fiscal equalisation reform, both cases with
a dominant coalition, represent important policy changes in their respective
policy subsystems. On the contrary, with a structure of competing coali-
tions, policy change is hard to achieve. For example, the pension scheme
reform was defeated in a popular vote, and a new project was abandoned in
parliament a few years later. The telecommunications reform corresponds
to a technically unsatisfying compromise solution, but not to the initially
intended liberalisation of the domain.
The analysis shows that institutions influence coalition formation.However,
one should take into account that this influence is not deterministic and that
individual agency can further complicate things (Lubell et al. 2012; Radaelli
et al. 2012). The institutional context simply defines the framework under
which decision-making takes place, but does not guarantee that actors act
accordingly. For example, open venues give actors an opportunity to
negotiate, but it does not guarantee the successful formation of a dominant
coalition. Similarly, state actors might not manage to include all the actors
they need in their coalition in support of the international treaty. Further, it
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should be noted that at least state actors have the potential to partly influence
the openness of decision-making venues. Actorsmight therefore also try to use
institutional conditions in order to achieve their outcomes of interest.
The analysis in this paper is based on one of several possible strategies
to reconstruct coalitions, as well as only 11 cases. While I tried to be as
transparent as possible concerning the choices in the different steps of the
reconstruction of coalitions, others might disagree about some elements of
the procedure. However, it is unlikely that modifying one of the several
steps for the reconstruction of coalitions fundamentally affects the fuzzy-set
values for the cases, and thereby the results of the analysis. Further, while
the 11 most important policy processes in Switzerland between 2001 and
2006 cover a large set of policy subsystems and can therefore be considered
to represent the political system of Switzerland as a whole, one should
still be careful in generalising the results from this analysis. First, results
might not be valid for less important processes. For example, in less
important processes, it might be easier to form a dominant coalition even
with less open venues. Second, results might only be partly exportable
to other countries. Opening up the venues of political decision-making
might often allow compromise seeking, but the ability to do so is also
dependent on the political culture of a country. Further, results including
the condition of federalism are obviously not valid for non-federalist
countries. Europeanisation is present in many countries, but its effects on
coalition structures might depend on the specific system of government.
However, coalition formation in other political systems is also influenced
by different institutional conditions, and not by beliefs alone. Future
research should take institutional variation across countries and policy
subsystems into account.
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Appendix
Table A.1. Coalition structure and corresponding fuzzy-membership values
Power distribution Cases (power per coalition) Fuzzy-value
Dominant coalition: only one coalition or one coalition with about 100%
of power
1.00
Education (89/11) 0.91
Savings (79/21) 0.85
Persons (77/21/2) 0.83
Budget (75/16/8) 0.82
Foreigners (74/26) 0.81
Schengen (67/33) 0.73
Fiscal equalisation (64/36) 0.70
Infrastructure (58/15/14/12) 0.62
Crossover point: one coalition with 50% of power (with at least three coalitions) 0.5
Telecom (47/31/22) 0.37
Nuclear (44/28/27) 0.26
Pension (36/33/31) 0.08
Competing coalitions: two or more coalitions with the same amount of power 0
Table A.2. Federalism and fuzzy-membership values
Fuzzy-value Criterion for calibration Cases
1 Federalist: common project of Confederation and
cantons
Fiscal equalisation,
Education
0.8 Mainly federalist
0.6 Rather federalist, cantons strongly concerned Infrastructure
0.5 Crossover point: half of the project concerns
the federalist competence distribution,
half of it only competences of the
Confederation
0.4 Mostly Confederation, cantons concerned Schengen, Foreigners
0.2 Mostly Confederation, cantons weakly concerned Nuclear, Budget, Persons
0 Non-federalist: only Confederation Pension, Savings, Telecom
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Table A.3. Europeanisation and fuzzy-membership values
Fuzzy-value Criterion for calibration Cases
1 Europeanised: only international treaty
0.8 International treaty with some domestic aspects Savings, Schengen
0.6 International treaty with important domestic aspects Persons
0.5 Crossover point: half of the project concerns an
international treaty, half of it a domestic project
0.4 Indirectly Europeanised project/domestic project with
strong international dependencies
Foreigners, Telecom
0.2 Mainly domestic project with some international
dependencies
Nuclear
0 Domestic: only domestic project Pensions, Fiscal equalisation,
Budget, Education,
Infrastructure
Table A.4. Venue openness and fuzzy-membership values
Openness of venues Cases (Ø openness) Fuzzy-value
Open venues 0.75 1
Education (0.65) 0.81
Fiscal equalisation (0.60) 0.77
Foreigners (0.55) 0.65
Budget (0.54) 0.62
Infrastructure (0.52) 0.56
Crossover point: venues half open 0.5
Persons (0.45) 0.35
Nuclear (0.44) 0.33
Pensions (0.42) 0.28
Savings (0.37) 0.17
Schengen (0.34) 0.13
Telecom (0.3) 0.08
Closed venues 0.25 0
Table A.5. Necessary conditions
Dominant coalition Competing coalitions
Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage
Federalist project 0.52 n.r. 0.44 n.r.
Non-federalist project 0.68 n.r. 0.90 0.52
Europeanised project 0.44 n.r. 0.34 n.r.
Domestic project 0.74 n.r. 0.98 0.50
Open venues 0.63 n.r. 0.57 n.r.
Closed venues 0.65 n.r. 0.92 0.59
Bold values indicate consistency scores of 0.9 or higher.
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